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have to answer numerous questions
regarding the procedure of collective
bargaining for wages, hours, and
working conditions. By not limiting
the scope of the antitrust laws, the
Court concluded that the inherent
benefits of collective bargaining
would be in jeopardy. Moreover, the
Court noted that nonexpert judges or
juries may premise antitrust liability
on a premeditated agreement of
uniform behavior on the part of the
employers or on the lack of an
independent decision of a competing
employer.

Justice Stevens's dissent
an exemption from the
exemption
In his dissent, Justice Stevens
pointed out that an accommodation
must exist for the Congressional
policy favoring collective bargaining
and the Congressional policy
favoring free competition in

business markets. Although Justice
Stevens conceded that a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust
laws is necessary in certain circumstances, he indicated that the unique
nature of the professional sports
industry warrants a nonapplication
of the exemption from the antitrust
laws.
Justice Stevens noted that all
salaries in the professional sports
industry are individually negotiated-a practice which does not
exist in any other industry. He
emphasized that this practice existed
both before and after a 1982
collective bargaining agreement
which granted players an express
right to negotiate their respective
salaries individually with club
owners. However, because this
"developmental squad" introduces a
new expansion of the traditional
salaried players, he maintained that
the current imposition of fixed
wages on a player's benefits

package was not foreseeable during
the original 1982 collective bargaining agreement. Thus, Justice Stevens
found the "developmental squad" to
warrant special attention. In agreeing with the district court, he
concluded that the "developmental
squad" is a novel idea which was not
entertained by the 1982 agreement
between the players and the NFL.
Therefore, Justice Stevens determined that the antitrust exemption,
normally intrinsic to a collective
bargaining agreement, should not
apply because the Association did
not negotiate the players' rights in
the original 1982 agreement. Thus,
Justice Stevens concluded that the
antitrust exemption, coupled with
the lack of a mutually agreed upon
collective bargaining agreement,
would infringe upon the
Association's freedom to contract
and would contradict the very
purpose of the exemption-the
ability to negotiate freely.

Independent service organizations survive Kodak's
motion for summary judgment on Sherman Act claims
by PatrickMcGovern
In Eastman Kodak v. Image TechnicalService, Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992), the Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court's ruling that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether Kodak possessed market power in
the relevant market for service and parts for its machines
even though Kodak lacked market power in the relevant
market for the sale of its copying equipment. The Court
held as a matter of law that a single brand of product or
service can be a relevant market under the Sherman Act.
Further, the Court clarified its earlier standard for
summary judgment enunciated in MatsushitaElectrical
IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), by stating that a plaintiff in an antitrust case does
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not carry a special burden to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. The Court referred to its decision in
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986),
which held that a nonmoving party can survive a motion
for summary judgment if the court finds that the party's
inferences are reasonable.

Kodak's policy to maintain own products
Kodak manufactured and sold copiers and micrographic equipment and replacement parts for its equipment and offered service for Kodak equipment. Kodak
provided 80% to 95% of the service for Kodak ma-
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involved a specific intent to monopolize. In addition, the
chines; however, several independent service organizacourt held that the ISOs had submitted enough evidence
tions ("ISOs") competed against Kodak in the market
to disprove Kodak's business justifications for summary
for servicing and supplying parts for the Kodak equipjudgment purposes.
ment. Kodak adopted a policy designed to limit the
availability of parts to the ISOs in order to make it more
difficult for the ISOs to compete with Kodak in servicSupreme Court affirms denial of
ing Kodak equipment. Kodak implemented a policy of
summary judgment
selling replacement parts for its machines only to buyers
of Kodak equipment who used Kodak services or
Court determines sufficient
repaired their own machines.
evidence of tying arrangement exists
In 1987, eighteen ISOs sued Kodak in the United
The Supreme Court first addressed Kodak's defense
States District Court for the Northern District of
that its activities did not constitute a tying arrangement.
California, alleging that Kodak's policies violated the
The Court defined a tying arrangement as "an agreement
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I et. seq. (1996). The ISOs
by a party to sell one product but only on the condition
claimed that Kodak unlawfully tied the sale of service
that the buyer also purchase a different (or tied) product
for its machines to the sale of parts, in violation of
or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and unlawfully monopofrom any other supplier." NorthernPacificRailway Co.
lized and attempted to monopolize the sale of service
and parts for its machines in violation of Section 2 of the v. UnitedStates, 356 U.S. 1,5-6 (1958). The Court
explained that for the ISOs' claim of a tying arrangeSherman Act. After limited discovery, the district court
ment to prevail over Kodak's motion for summary
granted summary judgment in favor of Kodak, holding
a reasonable trier of fact would have to find
judgment,
that the ISOs failed to provide evidence of a tying
(1)
that
service
and parts are two distinct products, i.e.,
arrangement between Kodak equipment and Kodak
demand exists so that it is efficient
sufficient
consumer
service or parts. The court held that, although Kodak
parts separately from service; and
a
firm
to
provide
for
for
its
over
the
market
a
natural
monopoly
possessed
(2) that Kodak tied the sale of service and parts. The
parts, Kodak's unilateral refusal to sell those parts to the
Court found that sufficient evidence existed to establish
ISOs did not violate Section 2.
that service and parts were sold separately and that
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals for the Ninth
efficiencies were evident in a separate services market.
Circuit reversed, finding that the ISOs "had presented
Kodak argued that there cannot be two markets
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue concerning
without a separate demand for parts (from service), e.g.,
Kodak's market power in the service and parts markets,
an individual services market and an individual parts
and rejected Kodak's contention that lack of market
market. The Court rejected Kodak's unified market
power in service and parts must be assumed when such
power is absent in the equipment market" with respect to claim, concluding that this issue was for a trier of fact to
decide. Finally, the Court held that the ISOs had
the Section 1 claim. The Ninth Circuit also considered
submitted sufficient evidence of a tie between service
the three business justifications Kodak offered for its
and parts because Kodak would only sell parts to third
restrictive parts policy: (1) guarding against inadequate
parties if they agreed not to buy service from any ISOs.
service; (2) lowering inventory costs; and (3) preventing
the ISOs from free-riding on Kodak's investment in the
copier and micrographic industries. The court rejected
ISOs present sufficient evidence
these arguments, stating, inter alia, that the trier of fact
of Kodak's market power
might find that a less restrictive means existed for
After finding sufficient evidence of a tying arrangeachieving Kodak's quality-related goals. Further, the
ment, the Court examined whether Kodak possessed
court found Kodak's free-rider argument legally
market power in the tying market. The Court explained
insufficient.
that "market power is the power to force a purchaser to
Addressing the Section 2 claim, the Ninth Circuit
do something that he would not do in a competitive
concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support a
market." Jefferson ParishHosp. Dist.No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
claim that Kodak's parts policy was anticompetitive and
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U.S. 2, 14 (1983). In attempting to show Kodak's
market power, the ISOs contended that Kodak possessed
sufficient power in the parts market to force purchasers
to buy unwanted service. For example, the ISOs offered
evidence indicating that Kodak forced consumers to
switch to Kodak service although consumers preferred
the ISOs' service(s). Many of Kodak's coercive techniques, the ISOs asserted, forced the ISOs out of
business. The Court further held that the ISOs submitted sufficient evidence to entitle them to a trial on their
claim of Kodak's market power.

Court clarifies Matsushita
The Court next addressed Kodak's argument that it
could not exercise the necessary market power for
Section 1 purposes even if it possessed a monopoly
share of the parts market because competition existed in
the equipment market. Kodak argued that if it charged
monopolistic prices in the service and parts market, the
profits gained from that market would be offset by a
corresponding loss in the equipment sales market
because consumers would purchase equipment with
lower service costs rather than buy Kodak products.
According to Kodak, there would be no genuine issue of
material fact on the market power issue. Kodak further
asserted that if the Court adopted the presumption that
equipment competition precludes a finding of the
exercise of monopoly power in the aftermarket of
service and parts, the Court's adoption of this presumption against a finding of market power would be
consistent with its holding in Matsushita Electrical
IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986). This is primarily because the existence of market
power in the service and parts market without power in
the equipment market would not make any economic
sense.
Expressing skepticism regarding Kodak's argument,
the Court stated that it preferred to examine actual
economic realities of the market rather than legal
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions in
determining market power. The Court disagreed with
Kodak's assertion that Matsushita introduced a special
burden upon plaintiffs facing summary judgment in
antitrust cases, reaffirming its requirement in Matsushita
that a plaintiff's claims must make economic sense. The
Court explained that Matsushitaonly requires that the
nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to
1997

reach the jury. The Court indicated that summary
judgment should be granted in the defendant's favor
when the plaintiff's theory is economically senseless.
After delineating the standard for summary judgment,
the Court applied this standard to Kodak's motion.
Despite evidence of Kodak's increased prices and
exclusion of competition, the Court stated that Kodak
must show that an inference of market power is unreasonable.
The Court began its analysis of whether Kodak met
its burden for summary judgment by reviewing "crosselasticity of demand" in the relevant market. Crosselasticity of demand is "[t]he extent to which one market
prevents exploitation of another market depending on
the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a price change in
another." United States v. E. L DuPontde Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956). Claiming cross-elasticity
of demand in its markets, Kodak argued that any
increase in prices above competitive levels in the parts
or service market would discourage potential customers
from buying Kodak equipment and, consequently, injure
Kodak's competitive abilities in the future. According to
Kodak, this was an "economic reality." Thus, Kodak
urged the Court to accept, as a matter of law, that
competition in the equipment market automatically
foreclosed market power in the service or parts market.
The Court rejected Kodak's "economic reality"
argument, concluding that Kodak could compensate for
the loss in equipment sales by charging high prices in
the aftermarkets. The Court stated that Kodak's claim
that a long-term disaster would occur if it charged
monopolistic prices in the aftermarkets ignored the
availability of an "optimum price"--which is somewhere between a competitive price and a ruinous one.
According to the Court, although the equipment market
may restrain prices in the aftermarkets, the fact did not
disprove the existence of market power in those markets.
Thus, the Court concluded that no rule exists which
holds that competition in the equipment market cannot
coexist with market power in the aftermarkets.

Market reality contradicts Kodak's
theory
Upon finding that the ISOs' assertion that Kodak
possessed market power in the aftermarkets was
possible, the Court addressed whether such an assertion
Related Cases e 83

was unreasonable given actual market behavior.
In assessing the market, the Court found that Kodak
had adopted a restrictive sales policy designed to
eliminate ISO service and raised service prices for
Kodak customers without suffering reduced equipment
sales. According to the Court, this market reality
contradicted Kodak's theory. Furthermore, the Court
rejected Kodak's attempt to explain the market reality by
claiming that it adopted a marketing strategy which
resulted in an overall competitive price. The Court
explained that the significant information and switching
costs involved in the complex, durable equipment at
issue undermined Kodak's argument.

Kodak failed to show ISO
inference was unreasonable
In summarizing its holding with respect to the
Section 1 claim, the Court concluded that Kodak failed
to show the inference that Kodak possessed market
power in the aftermarkets was unreasonable. Emphasizing that the ISOs offered direct evidence of Kodak's
ability to raise prices and to drive out competition in the
aftermarket, the Court found that the inference that
Kodak possessed market power in the aftermarkets was
reasonable and that the ISOs' allegations made economic sense. Accordingly, the court held that Kodak was
not entitled to summary judgment on the ISOs' Section 1
claim.

ISOs present sufficient evidence for
Section 2 claim to survive
The Court stated that two elements are necessary to
show a Section 2 Sherman Act violation: 1) the possession of monopoly power, which is greater than market
power in the relevant market; and 2) the willful acquisition and maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.

Kodak's monopoly power to defeat a motion for
summary judgment as to the first element of the Section
2 claim. Moreover, the Court rejected Kodak's contention that, as a matter of law, a single brand of a product
or service can never be a relevant market under the
Sherman Act.

Kodak's use of monopoly power:
A factual question
Next, the Court addressed the second element of a
Section 2 claim: the use of monopoly power to foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to
destroy a competitor. Having already determined that the
ISOs had presented evidence of Kodak's monopolistic
behavior, the Court examined whether Kodak possessed
any legitimate business reasons for its actions. The
Court held that factual questions existed, (i.e., Kodak's
desire for quality control, lower inventory costs, and the
prevention of free-riding by ISOs). In holding that
summary judgment was inappropriate, the Court,
nonetheless, questioned many of Kodak's claimed
business justifications, and allowed the ISOs to proceed
to trial with their Sherman Act claims.

Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor and
Justice Thomas, dissented. The dissent disagreed with
the majority's finding that single-brand market power
over aftermarket products constitutes sufficient "market
power" to permit an antitrust plaintiff to invoke the per
se rule against tying. Moreover, the dissent disagreed
that market power could be found in the record in this
case, arguing that the majority's opinion would lead to
increased litigation and harm genuine competition.
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority's application
of the per se tying prohibition and monopolization
doctrine to a seller's behavior in its single-brand
aftermarkets is misplaced where the seller lacks power
at the inter-brand level.

Sufficient evidence of monopoly
power
Due to Kodak's control of nearly 100% of the parts
market and at least 80% of the service market, the Court
held that sufficient evidence existed with regard to
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